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ABSTRACT
This paper adds to the overconfidence literature by specifically considering the
differential nature of information and its use by different classes of investors. The literature
suggests that overconfidence is a major determinant of stock trading volume. We postulate that
private investors are more prone to overconfidence bias as compared to institutional investors.
This implies that turnover in firms with low institutional ownership will be driven more by
private information while turnover in firms with high institutional ownership will be driven more
by public information. This is the essence of the two hypotheses we explore. We find strong
evidence in support of the first proposition but only mixed evidence in support of the second
proposition. However, the second proposition is found to be very significant in the most recent
period if certain low value or low liquidity stocks are excluded from the data.
Keywords: Overconfidence, Behavioral finance, Over (under) reaction, Trading volume
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INTRODUCTION
Stock trading volume in financial markets has been extensively studied in the literature
(for example, Glaser and Weber (2007), Statman et al (2006), Chae (2005), and Covrig and Ng
(2004)). This attention to trading volume is not without reason. Several studies indicate that the
trading volume in financial markets far exceeds what would normally be expected from rational
traders. Glaser et al (2004) calculate the trading volume as a percentage of market capitalization
in 2002 to be 100% in USA, 215% in UK, 180% in Germany, 115% in France and 70% in Japan.
They contend that rational motives for trade are not sufficient to explain the high trading volume.
The high trading volume is even more surprising in view of the finding that those who trade the
most lose the most (Odean (1999). DeBondt and Thaler (1995) observe that the high trading
volume in financial markets “is perhaps the single most embarrassing fact to the standard finance
paradigm.”
The traditional neoclassical models of the standard finance paradigm assume investor
rationality and homogeneity. These models have not been very successful in explaining many
observed financial market phenomena including the high trading volume of stocks. In an attempt
to explain these anomalies, there has been a gradual but perceptible shift in the finance literature
to a behaviorally based paradigm in which investors are imperfectly rational and prone to
systematic biases. One such judgment bias is overconfidence. Extant cognitive psychology
literature establishes that overconfidence is a pervasive trait among people. Overconfident
investors overrate their ability to evaluate securities as a result of overestimating the precision of
their private information signals. Odean (1999) argues that overconfidence is the key
determinant of trading volume. Several other researchers support this finding, for example Benos
(1998), Wang (1998), Gervais and Odean (2001) and Statman et al (2006).
Psychologists also find that people systematically underweight some types of information
and overweight others, and the effects of overconfidence depends on how information is
distributed in a market and who is overconfident (Odean (1998)). It follows that in order to fully
gauge the impact of overconfidence on stock trading volume, it is not sufficient to merely
establish an aggregative relationship but also to fine tune the research format to account for the
informativeness of the news and the type of investor. As the subsequent literature review shows,
several researchers have considered these additional dimensions of overconfidence in isolation
but never together to empirically test the relationship between overconfidence and the volume of
stock trading. In this paper, we consider in the same model the differential impact of information
- private and public - on investors - individual and institutional.
Trading volume arises from changes in investor beliefs associated with new information.
The new information may be private or public. Daniel et al (1998) postulate that investors
overreact to private information and under react to public information. Informed investors
receive noisy signals about the true value of a security. If the signal is private, they react to the
signal with overconfidence by overestimating its precision. If the signal is public, then investors
are not overconfident and correctly estimate its precision. Chuang and Lee (2006) also find that
if investors are overconfident, they overreact to private information and under react to public
information. He and Wang (1995) develop a theoretical model in which they show the
differential impact of public and private information on trading volume pattern. They posit that
private information mostly influences the trading behavior of institutional investors while public
information influences the trading behavior of both institutional and individual investors. Thus,
the differential impact of private and public information on volume is well recognized in the
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literature and must be modeled for a comprehensive study of the effect of overconfidence on
trading volume.
The differences in the trading behavior of institutional and individual investors are well
documented though the findings are by no means unanimous. Barber and Odean (2008) posit that
the buying and selling behavior of institutional and individual investors is different. Shefrin
(2005) surveys the extant literature on heterogeneity in the judgments of individual investors and
professional investors, and concludes that the two react in opposite ways to past market
movements and by more than is justified. By and large individual investors forecast future
returns by engaging in trend following and predicting continuation. Professional investors, on the
other hand, believe they face mean reverting random processes and are excessive in predicting
reversals. Covrig and Ng (2004) find a stronger relation between volume and lagged absolute
return in stocks with greater institutional ownership. Cho and Jo (2006) assume that individual
investors are more overconfident relative to institutions i.e. these investors are more susceptible
to the psychological biases when they are processing information than institutional traders.
Glaser et al (2004), however, come to the opposite conclusion. They find that judgments of
professionals (traders who work in the trading room of a large bank and investment bankers) are
biased, and their degree of overconfidence is higher than the respective scores of a student
control group. In most tasks, this difference is significant. In our model, we let the data decide
which of the two groups is more overconfident.
Tests for the empirical validation of the overconfidence theory have followed one of two
tracts. One approach is to test the validity of the assumptions on which the theory is based (for
example, Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002), Hilton (2001) and Graham and Harvey (2002)) and
the other is to test its predictions (for example, Statman et al. (2003), Odean (1999), Daniel et al
(1998)). The most important prediction of the theory is that trading volume increases with an
increasing degree of overconfidence. Odean (1998) calls this the most robust effect of
overconfidence. Statman et al. (2003) test the trading volume predictions of formal
overconfidence models in the U.S. stock market. Their hypothesis is that high returns will be
followed by high trading volume because the investment success of investors will increase their
degree of confidence. They find that share turnover is positively related to lagged returns for
many months. They interpret their results as evidence of overconfidence. We follow Statman et
al. to test the relationship between stock turnover and overconfidence for institutional and
individual investors while allowing for the differential reaction to private and public information.
Stock prices reflect both public and private information but the relative proportion of
each may differ between stocks for reasons such as the dissimilar cost of producing private
information. Although it is difficult to disaggregate the two kinds of information and measure
each directly, the literature suggests two indirect measures for quantifying private and public
information. The first uses price nonsynchronicity as a measure of private information. It was
proposed by Roll (1988). The correlation of stock return with the market and industry return is a
measure of public information while the firm specific return or idiosyncratic risk is a measure of
private information. Roll (1988) showed that price nonsynchronicity has very little correlation
with public news and seems to capture private information. Price nonsynchronicity as a measure
of private information has been used in several studies, for example Chen et al. (2007), Durnev
et al. (2004), and Morck et al. (2000). The second measure of private information is Probability
of Informed Trading (PIN). This measure was proposed by Easley et al. (1996). It is based on a
structural market microstructure model and captures the probability of informed trading in a
stock. In this study, we use price nonsynchronicity to measure private information.
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The market microstructure literature recognizes the diversity of motivation, strategies and
tactics of traders and accordingly models this heterogeneity by various classifications such as,
‘informed’ and ‘uninformed’ traders, ‘newswatchers’ and ‘momentum’ traders, ‘fundamentalist’
and ‘technical’ traders, ‘rational’ and ‘noise’ traders. These classifications are not mutually
exclusive and often overlap to a great extent. In order to be consistent with the previous research
on overconfidence, we model the trader heterogeneity in terms of ‘institutional’ and ‘individual’
traders. We start with all the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) firms in the CRSP database and
use two methods to sort the firms in accordance with their degree of institutional ownership. The
first is to sort the firms into deciles; the second is to sort them in quintiles. Table 2 reports the
deciles results and Table 3 the quintile results. The portfolios are rebalanced each year. We select
the top and bottom decile to represent stocks with high and low institutional ownership
respectively. Our model is then run separately on the high and low institutional portfolio.
The major contribution of this paper is threefold. First, it directly tests the Daniel et al.
(1998) proposition that investors overreact to private information and under react to public
information. Existing studies on investor overconfidence typically use stock returns as a measure
of aggregate information flow without differentiating between private and public information as,
for example, Statman et al(2006) and Corvig and Ng (2004). Chuang and Lee (2006) do test for
the differential impact of private and public information but their model is driven by a very
restrictive assumption under which public information shocks only trading volume and private
information shocks only returns. Such an assumption is debatable and makes their conclusions
fuzzy. This study is the first to use a direct measure of private information to test the implications
of private information on overconfidence trading. Second, this paper is a far more detailed
empirical investigation of the relationship between trading volume and overconfidence than has
hitherto been conducted in the literature. Although the overconfidence literature has recognized
the differential impact of private and public information on traders, and the differences in the
behavior of institutional and individual investors, the two traits have not been investigated
together. Third, this paper provides evidence regarding the extent of overconfidence in
institutional and individual traders. It is generally assumed in the literature that the
overconfidence trait is found dominantly, if not exclusively, in the individual investors.
However, Glaser et al (2004), find that judgments of professionals traders are biased, and their
degree of overconfidence are higher than the respective scores of a student control group. This
research provides evidence to resolve this conundrum.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we develop the hypotheses;
Section 3 explains the methodology and formulates the models; Section 4 describes the data
while Section 5 analyzes the results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
HYPOTHESES
Barber and Odean (2000) find that individual investors trade more than can be rationally
justified. Since this excessive trading does not lend itself to a rational explanation, behavioral
models have been adduced to explain this observed market phenomenon. Statman et al. (2006)
propose investor overconfidence as a major driver of over trading. Daniel et al. (1998) also
model overconfidence and posit that investors overreact to private information and underreact to
public information. Since excessive trading is particularly associated with individual investors,
we hypothesize that stocks with low institutional ownership will be more prone to
overconfidence trading. This provides the rationale for our first hypothesis:
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H1: Private information is a stronger driver of stock turnover in firms with low institutional
ownership as compared to firms with high institutional ownership.
Our contention is that private information comprises both good information and noise.
However, the noise traders are unable to differentiate between the two and trade “on noise as if it
were information” (Black (1986)). Thus, even if institutional traders are more informed and may
have more good private information, we posit that their total tradable private information set is
smaller because of the large preponderance of noise in the set of the individual investors who are
given more to behavioral biases and fads. Thus, Dow and Gorton (2006) opine that “A large
literature argues that individual investor trading is subject to a myriad of psychological biases,
and that such individuals may use various heuristics, ‘popular models,’ as the basis for their
investment decisions.” A second reason in support of the hypothesis is that “the information
traders can never be sure that they are trading on information rather than noise. What if the
information they have has already been reflected in prices?” (Black (1986)). Black further argues
that information only provides an edge and the possession of good information is not a guarantee
for a profitable trade. Taking a large position means taking on more risk. So if arbitrage is costly,
there is a limit to the position that a trader will take. Thus, informed institutional owners may not
be able to trade very intensively on their good information.
The primary cause for stock trade is a change in the information set of investors. The
information set consists of both public and private information. If the trades of individual
investors are driven relatively more by private information, we surmise that the trades of
institutional investors would be driven more by public information. This provides the rationale
for our second hypothesis:
H2: Public information is a stronger driver of stock turnover in firms with high institutional
ownership as compared to firms with low institutional ownership.
H2 is not actually hypothesized in the overconfidence literature but appears to be a
natural corollary of H1 that requires empirical validation. Since noise trading – typically an
individual investor phenomenon – will be strongest in firms with low institutional ownership, the
relative mix of public information trading to private information trading will be in favor of the
latter. The relative mix will become more favorable for public information trading as the
institutional ownership increases and the influence of noise traders wanes.
METHODOLOGY
We modify Corvig and Ng’s (2004) model and apply it using the Seemingly Unrelated
Regression (SUR) technique. The model postulates that stock turnover is a function of
information flow and can be represented by the function:
Vt+1 = a + b*Vt + c*Vt*Ft
Where Vt is detrended log Turnover and Ft measures information flow in time period t.
Since firms typically have both institutional and private stockholders, we sort the firms in our
sample into subgroups based on institutional ownership. We use five group (quintile) and ten
group (decile) sorts and test the hypothesis whether private information is a stronger driver of
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stock turnover in firms with low institutional ownership as compared to firms with high
institutional ownership by using the two groups at each end i.e. the group with the highest (hi)
and the group with the lowest (lo) institutional ownership. Our two core models for testing this
hypothesis take the following form:
Model 1: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + bhi*Vhi,t + chi*Vhi,t*PI1hi,t
: Vlo,t+1 = alo + b(lo)*Vlo,t + clo*Vlo,t*PI1lo,t
Model 2: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + bhi*Vhi,t + chi*Vhi,t*PI2hi,t
: Vlo,t+1 = alo + b(lo)*Vlo,t + clo*Vlo,t*PI2lo,t
Vhi(lo),t is detrended logTurnover in period t for the high (low) institutional ownership
quintile/decile. Turnover (daily) is calculated as shares traded on day t divided by outstanding
shares on that day. Consistent with previous literature such as Campbell et al (1993) and Llorente
et al. (2002), Turnover proxies for trading volume of individual stocks. LogTurnover(t) is
computed as log[turnover(t) + 0.00000255]. A small constant is added to the turnover before
taking the log to cater for situations where the trading volume on a particular day may be zero.
The value of the constant is chosen to maximize the normality of the distribution of daily trading
volume. Detrended V(t) = logTurnover(t) – (average of past 200 days’ logTurnover)
The Turnover transformation we use is consistent with previous literature such as Lo and Wang
(2001), Llorente et al (2002), and Corvig and Ng(2004). We use two measures of private
information PI1 and PI2. PI1 is computed as log[(1 – r2 )/ r2 ] where r2 is obtained from the
following regression:
Rj = a + bRm + cRi + e
where Rj, Rm and Ri are return on security j, market return, and security j’s industry return
respectively. For each month, we regress each firm’s daily return on the market and 3-digit SIC
value-weight industry returns. (1-r2) is a proxy for private information on the stock. This measure
is used in Chen et al. (2007). We use the log transformation of this measure because in some
years, 1-r2 is leptokurtic and negatively skewed. This transformation is used in Durnev, Morck,
and Yeung (2004).
We test whether the coefficient chi is less than the coefficient clo in our models. A
significant difference validates hypothesis 1.
The two core models for testing hypothesis 2 are models 3 and 4 below:
Model 3: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf|
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) +e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf|
Model 4: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf|
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf|
MV(t) is detrended logTurnover of the Market in period t and is transformed in the same way as
Vt.
|RmRf| is the absolute value of the difference between the return on the market and the
risk free rate. MV(t)* |RmRf| proxies for publicly available market information and the

Trading volume, page 6

Journal of Behavioral Studies in Business
coefficient e on the cross product term measures the effect of market information. We follow
here Corvig and Ng (2007), Llorente et al. (2002) and Durnev and Nain (2007).
We test whether the coefficient ehi is more than the coefficient elo in our models. A
significant difference validates hypothesis 2.
It is necessary to examine whether our findings are driven by missing variables. For this
purpose, we develop eight additional models to perform robustness tests. These models
progressively add control variables to our core models – variables that extant literature has
shown to significantly influence stock trading volume.
Several researchers have documented the relationship between stock return volatility and
trading volume, for example Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) and Lee and Rui (2002). These
studies provide convincing evidence of a contemporaneous as well as dynamic relationship
between return volatility and trading volume. Accordingly, we sequentially introduce stock and
market volatility into Models 3 and 4.
Model 5: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) +e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t
Model 6: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) +e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t
Model 7: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) +e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) +e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt
Model 8: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) +e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt
Stock volatility (stk_Volat) is computed as the volatility of the daily stock return over the
past thirty days. Similarly market volatility (M_Volat) is computed as the volatility of the market
return over the past thirty days.
Researchers such as Gallant et al (1992) find that large price movements are followed by high
volume. Accordingly, we introduce stock price run up as a control variable in Models 9 and 10.
Model 9: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) +e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t
Model 10: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) +e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t
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Stock price run up (stk_runnup) is measured as the thirty day run up in stock price.
There is conflicting evidence on the relationship between momentum and volume. Lee
and Swaminathan (2000) show a relationship between turnover and momentum profits. Connolly
and Stivers (2003) also evidence such a relationship but Scott et al. (2003) attribute this observed
relationship to underreaction to earnings news. They find that the interaction between
momentum and volume disappears when a stock’s growth rate and earnings-related news are
controlled for. It is necessary, therefore, to add momentum as a control variable regardless of
whether there is a direct relationship or whether this observed relationship is a proxy for growth
rate and the underreaction to earnings news. The addition of momentum generates Models 11
and 12.
Model 11: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf|
+fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t + M_momentumt
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t + M_momentumt
Model 12: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t + M_momentumt
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t + M_momentumt
Market momentum (M_momentum) is measured as the raw returns of the market in the past two
months.
The above SUR regression models require the formation of high and low institutional
ownership portfolios and use portfolio returns in the regressions. In order to test the robustness of
our results using individual stock returns , we perform cross-sectional regressions using the firstorder autoregressive model of Corvig and Ng (2004) to study the differential impact of private
and public information on trading volume.
The basic model takes the following form:
Vi,t+1 = Σ a0,ik Dk,t+1 + a1,iVi,t + εi,t+1
Where:
Vi, is detrended log turnover, and Dk,t+1 are the day-of-week dummy variables.
The model is then augmented by adding private information flow. With the two measures of
private information we use in this paper, we get the following two versions:
Vi,t+1 = Σ a0,ik Dk,t+1 + a1,iVi,t + a2,iVi,tPI1i,t + εi,t+1
And
Vi,t+1 = Σ a0,ik Dk,t+1 + a1,iVi,t + a2,iVi,tPI2i,t + εi,t+1
The coefficient a1,I for Vi,t represents the constant component of volume autocorrelation
whereas the coefficient a2,iVfor Vi,tPI represents the effect on volume autocorrelation that varies
with the flow of information.
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DATA
We start with all the NYSE firms in the CRSP database during the period 1990-2007. We
delete financials (6000-6999) and utilities (4000-4949). We also exclude ADRs and REITs, and
firms with firm-year observations with less than 30 days of trading. Finally we delete from our
sample firms that do not have common shares traded as indicated by CRSP share codes 10 or 11.
We conduct two parallel set of tests; in one, we dice the sample into ten groups (deciles) in
descending order of institutional ownership and in the other we dice the full sample into five
groups (quintiles) based on the same criterion. Stocks in each group constitute an equal weighted
portfolio. The portfolios are rebalanced each year. The model inputs come from the top and
bottom decile (quintile) portfolios – the two being representative of high and low institutional
ownership. We also divide the full sample period into two sub periods 1990-97 and 1998-2007 to
test for the stability of the results.
Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics of the high (top decile) and low (bottom decile)
institutional ownership portfolios in our sample. In all of the attributes listed in the table, there is
a statistically significant difference in the mean and median of the high and low institutional
ownership portfolios. It is self-evident from the table that the high institutional ownership
portfolio is comprised of firms with larger size, higher stock price (PRC), greater stock turnover,
and a larger holding period profit (Hpret). Consistent with the hypotheses we are investigating,
both the measures of private information, PI1 and PI2, are larger in low-institutional ownership
firms as compared to the high-institutional ownership firms.
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
Core model augmented with standard control variables
Table 2 reports the results of estimating models 1 to 12 with a ten group sort of the data
based on decreasing institutional ownership. Table 3 reports the result of a similar sort but into
five groups. Hereafter, we refer to the two variables V*PI1 and V*PI2 jointly as Vt.Inf. We
focus on the coefficients of Vt.Inf for hypothesis 1, and the coefficient of Mkt.Inf for hypothesis
2. A negative coefficient on Vt.Inf indicates that private information and turnover are negatively
related. If the Vt.Inf coefficient is negative for both the high and low institutional
deciles/quintiles, then a larger negative coefficient for the high institutional group supports
hypothesis 1. If the coefficients are positive for both the high and low institutional groups then a
smaller positive for the high institutional group backed by a significant F-value for the model
would also support hypothesis 1.
The coefficient for Mkt.Info provides evidence for the veracity of hypothesis 2. A more
positive coefficient for the high institutional ownership decile/quintile or a less negative one
compared to the low institutional ownership group implies that the less overconfident investors
i.e. the high institutional group relies more on public information (Mkt.Info) as compared to the
more overconfident investors i.e. the less institutional group. This is supportive of hypothesis 2.
Models 1 and 2 for both the decile and quintile sort validate hypothesis 1. The coefficients for
Vt.Inf with PI1 are -0.0483 and -0.0193 for the high and low institutional ownership in Model 1
of Table 2, and the F-value is 2.98 which is significant at the 10% level. When PI2 is used as the
measure of private information in Model 2, the coefficients for Vt.Inf are -0.0271 and 0.0075 for
the high and low specifications with an F-value of 3.94 which is significant at the 5% level. The
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results in Table 3 with the quintile sort are even more significant. The coefficients for Vt.Inf
(PI1) are -0.0766 and 0.0015 for the high and low specifications respectively with an F-value of
23.75 which is significant at the 1% level. With PI2, the results are similar. The coefficients for
Vt.Inf with PI2 are -0.4425 and 0.0136 for the high and low regressions respectively and the Fvalue of 20.31 is significant at the 1% level.
Then we introduce detrended market turnover (MVt) and market information (M.Info)
into the models, the latter as a proxy for public information, and test hypotheses 1 and 2 together
in Models 3 and 4. In the decile sort, the Vt.Info coefficients for both Models 3 and 4 support
hypothesis 1; the high coefficient for Vt.Info (PI1) (-0.0286) is more negative than the low
coefficient (-0.0256) in Model 3 and similarly the high coefficient of Vt.Info (PI2) (-0.0219) is
smaller than the low coefficient (0.0068) in Model 4, but the F-values for hypotheses 1 is
significant only in Model 4. For the public information proxy, the coefficients for M.Info in
Models 3 and 4 are supportive of hypothesis 2 i.e. the positive coefficients of the high equations
(8.5719 and 9.0401) are greater than the positive coefficients of the low equations (5.3324 and
6.1926) in Models 3 and 4. However the F-values for hypothesis 2 in both models are not
significant. With the quintile sort, both Hypotheses 1 and 2 are validated. The signs and sizes of
the coefficients for Vt.Info and M.Info are as predicted by hypotheses 1 and 2, and the F-values
for the hypotheses are significant.
Next we start introducing the control variables. The first control variable introduced is
stock volatility. The estimation results after the introduction of this variable are provided in
Models 5 and 6 of Tables 2 and 3. In the decile sort (Table 2), the sign and magnitude of Vt.Info
(PI2) coefficients in the high and low equations of Model 6 are supportive of hypothesis 1 (0.0199<.0038) and the F-value for the hypothesis is significant albeit at the 10% level. But the
high and low coefficients of Vt.Info (PI1) do not have the expected signs and sizes in Model 5,
and neither is the F-value significant for hypothesis 1. For the public information proxy, MInfo,
the sign-size combinations in both Models 5 and 6 are supportive of hypothesis 2 but the Fvalues of both models are not significant. The t-statistics of the control variable stock volatility
are significant for the high equations of Model 5 and 6, but not so for the low equations of the
SUR model. Thus stock volatility appears to be significant only for portfolios with high
institutional ownership. In the quintile sort (Table 3), the sign-size combinations for the
coefficients of Vt.Info with PI1 and PI2, and the public information proxy MVt are supportive of
hypotheses 1 and 2 in both Models 5 and 6, but the F-values for both hypotheses in both the
models are not significant.
The next control variable introduced is market volatility (M. Volatility). The estimation
results after the introduction of this variable are provided in Models 7 and 8 of Tables 2 and 3. In
the decile sort (Table 2), the sign and magnitude of the high and low coefficients of Vt.Info (PI2)
are supportive of hypotheses 1 (-0.0198<.0077) in Model 8 and the F-value for the hypothesis is
significant albeit at the 10% level. But the high and low coefficients of Vt.Info (PI1) do not have
the expected signs and sizes in Model 7, and neither is the F-value significant for hypothesis 1.
For the public information proxy, M.Info, the sign-size combinations in both Models 7 and 8 are
supportive of hypothesis 2 but the F-values of both models are not significant. The t-statistics of
the control variable market volatility are significant for the low equations of Model 7 and 8, but
not so for the high equations. Thus while stock volatility appears to be significant only for
portfolios with high institutional ownership, market volatility appears to be significant only for
portfolios with low institutional ownership. In the quintile sort (Table 3), the sign-size
combinations for the coefficients of Vt.Info with PI1 and PI2, and the public information proxy
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M.Info for both Models 7 and 8 are supportive of hypotheses 1 and 2, but the F-value for only
hypothesis 2 of Model 7 is significant while the other F-values are not.
Stock run up (Stk_Runup) is then introduced as a dependent variable. The estimation
results after the introduction of this variable are provided in Models 9 and 10 of Tables 2 and 3.
In the decile sort (Table 2), the sign and magnitude of the coefficients of Vt.Info with PI2 in the
high and low equations of Model 10 are supportive of hypothesis 1 (-0.0177<.0114) and the Fvalue for the hypothesis is significant albeit at the 10% level. But the high and low coefficients
of Vt.Info (PI1) do not have the expected signs and sizes in Model 9, and the F-value for
hypothesis 1 is not significant. For the public information proxy, M.Info, the sign-size
combinations in both Models 9 and 10 are supportive of hypotheses 2 but the F-values of both
models are not significant. The t-statistics of the control variable Stock run up are significant for
the low equations of Model 9 and 10, but not so for the high equations. Interestingly, stock
market volatility that was previously significant only for the high equations, now becomes
significant for the low equations as well but with a negative sign. Thus stock market volatility
positively impacts turnover of stocks with high institutional ownership, but it negatively impacts
turnover of stocks with low market volatility. In the quintile sort (Table 3), the sign-size
combinations for the coefficients of Vt.Info with both PI1 and PI2, and the public information
proxy M.Info are supportive of hypotheses 1 and 2 in both Models 9 and 10, and the F-values are
significant for hypothesis 1 for Model 9 but not so for Model 10. However, the F-values for
hypothesis 2 are significant in both Models 9 and 10.
The last control variable introduced in the model is market momentum (M.Momentum).
The estimation results after the introduction of this variable are provided in Models 11 and 12 of
Tables 2 and 3. In the decile sort, the sign and magnitude of the coefficients of Vt.Info (PI2) in
the high and low equations of Model 12 are supportive of hypothesis 1 (-0.0176<0.0115) and the
F-value for the hypothesis is significant albeit at the 10% level. But the high and low coefficients
of Vt.Info (PI1) in Model 11 do not have the expected signs and sizes, and the F-value for
hypothesis 1 is not significant. For the public information proxy, M.Info, the sign-size
combinations in both Models 11 and 12 are supportive of hypotheses 2 but the F-values of both
models are not significant. The t-statistics for the newly entered control variable, market
momentum, are not significant in any equation of Models 11 and 12. In the quintile sort (Table
3), the sign-size combinations for the coefficients of Vt.Info with PI1 and PI2, and the public
information proxy M.Info are supportive of hypotheses 1 and 2 in both Models 11 and 12. The Fvalues for hypotheses 1 and 2 are significant for Model 11, but not significant for Model 12.
Estimation results with truncated data
We further explore the validity of the hypotheses by constraining the data only to certain
time periods and/or by excluding firms with certain characteristics from the data set. Thus we
estimate the full model i.e. the core model with the control variables for the sub-periods 19901997 and 1998-2006. We also study the effect of excluding firms from the data set based on
share price, size and liquidity; in each case we drop ten percent of the firms having the lowest
share price, size, and liquidity. The results are summarized in Table 4. The first column provides
a description of the data set and sort, the second summarizes the result of estimating the model
for the whole period 1990-2006. The third and fourth column summarizes the results of
estimating the model for the sub-periods 1990-1997 and 1998-2006. The first two rows
summarize the results of the full model estimated using a decile and a quintile sort respectively.
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The sub-period results indicate that the propositions of hypotheses 1 and 2 had greater validity in
the first sub-period 1990-1997 as compared to the second sub-period 1998-2006 because the
number of models in which the hypotheses were found significant decline perceptibly in the
second sub period.
Rows 3 and 4 summarize the results of estimating the full model on a data set in which
ten percent of the firms with the lowest share prices for that year have been excluded. In the
decile sort (Row 3), the results for hypothesis 1 for the whole period improve marginally over
the full data set in that the hypothesis becomes significant in Model 3 in addition to the models in
which it was previously significant. The results for hypothesis 2 do not change. The results for
the sub-periods are illuminating. There is a dramatic increase in the significance of hypothesis 1
from being significant only in Model 2 during the first period to being significant in all twelve
models in the second period. There is an equally dramatic turnaround in hypothesis 2. In the first
sub-period, hypothesis 2 was significant in all models but with the wrong sign, implying that the
turnover of stocks with low institutional ownership was more related to public information as
compared to stocks with high institutional ownership. However, this position reversed in the
second sub-period so that hypothesis 2 registered significance in seven models with the right
sign. As a result of this dramatic turnaround, not surprisingly, hypothesis 2 does not show
significance for the whole period as the effects of the two sub-periods are opposite and cancel
each other out. Overall the results show that the propositions of hypotheses 1 and 2 are strongly
valid for the period 1998-2006 once the firms with low value shares are excluded. The final
conclusions from the quintile sort (Row 4) are similar – the propositions of hypotheses 1 and 2
are valid, more so for the second sub-period than the first.
Rows 5 and 6 summarize the results of estimating the full model on a data set in which
ten percent of the firms with the lowest log size for that year have been excluded. In the decile
sort (Row 5), the results are generally poorer than for the full data set - both in the whole period
and in the sub-periods. The only exception is hypothesis 2 in the second sub-period which shows
significance in Models 3 and 4 whereas it was insignificant in all models in the full data set.
Similar to the observation made in data set that excluded firms on size, we find that there is a
dramatic reversal in the significance of hypothesis 2 proposition from the first to the second subperiod. In the first sub-period, hypothesis 2 was significant in all models but with the wrong sign.
In the second sub-period, all the models had the correct sign and the hypothesis was significant
in Models 3 and 4. In the quintile sort (Row 6), the results for the whole period and the second
sub-period are not as good as for the full data set. However, the first sub-period is an exception.
The results for this sub-period are better in the truncated data set particularly for hypothesis 2
which is significant in all models. The results suggest that overconfident traders use more private
information in small stocks and that is the reason why the significance of private information
drops when small size stocks are excluded.
Rows 7 and 8 summarize the results of estimating the full model on a data set in which
ten percent of the firms with the lowest liquidity for that year have been excluded. Liquidity is
measured using the Amihud formula which defines liquidity as absolute return divided by dollar
volume. In both the decile and quintile sort, deleting the bottom ten percent liquidity stocks
significantly lowers the likelihood that hypothesis 1 is supported in the full period as well as the
sub-periods. This implies that overconfident traders use more private information in lowliquidity stocks. The results for hypothesis 2 are more mixed. As compared to the full data set,
the results for the significance of hypothesis 2 are marginally better in terms of significance for
the whole period, are the same for the first sub-period, and are considerably better for the second
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sub-period in the decile sort (Row 7). In the quintile sort, the results for hypothesis 2 are better
only for the second sub-period.
In conclusion, sub-sample results suggest that overconfident traders use more private
information in small and/or low-liquidity stocks. Deleting the bottom ten percent small stocks or
the bottom ten percent liquidity stocks in each year significantly lowers the likelihood that
hypothesis 1 is supported. This observation applies to both the quintile and decile classifications.
Deleting the bottom ten percent of the low-price stocks causes no significant change in the
results of hypothesis 1. This suggests that low share price does not encourage the use of private
information among overconfident traders.
Results of the first-order autoregressive model
In the SUR models described above, the inputs used in the regression are the equal
weighted portfolio averages. In the autoregressive model, the regressions are performed using
time-series cross-sectional method that employs individual stock data. The results are presented
in Table 5. Panel A presents the results of the base model in which the lagged detrended log of
the turnover and the day of the week dummy variables are the only explanatory variables. The
results show the presence of strong first-order autocorrelation in both the high and low
institutional ownership firms. However, the low institutional ownership firms exhibit a higher
serial correlation in their trading volume as compared to high institutional firms.
The model in Panel A is then augmented by introducing Vt.Info (PI1) as the measure of private
information. The estimation of the resultant model is presented in Panel B. The results show that
stocks with lower institutional ownership have a higher serial correlation in trading volume and
are more influenced by private information as measured by PI1.
Panel C model is similar to the Panel B model except that the private information measure used
is PI2. The results show that stocks with lower institutional ownership have a higher serial
correlation in trading volume and the volume is unaffected by private information as measured
by Vt.Info.
Overall the results in Table 5 suggest that stocks with low-institutional ownership exhibit
significantly higher serial correlation in trading volume. There is some evidence, as seen in Panel
B, that the trading volume of stocks of lower-institutional ownership is affected by traders’
private information (PI1).
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we add to the overconfidence literature by accounting for the source of
information and the type of investor. The literature suggests that overconfidence is a major
determinant of stock trading volume. Trading is triggered by the arrival of new information
which may be public or private. Overconfident investors overestimate the precision of their
private information signals and trade more than is warranted by the incoming signal. We
postulate that private investors are more prone to overconfidence bias as compared to
institutional investors. This implies that turnover in firms with low institutional ownership will
be driven more by private information (hypothesis 1) while turnover in firms with high
institutional ownership will be driven more by public information (hypothesis 2). This is the
essence of the two hypotheses we explore. We use two measures of private information, PI1 and
PI2, and sort the firms on the basis of institutional ownership into groups. We use both a ten
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group sort and a five group sort and employ SUR models to study the hypotheses by examining
the differences between the group with the highest and lowest institutional ownership. We find
strong evidence in favor of hypothesis 1. PI1 and PI2 are found to be significant both in the
decile and quintile sort when either PI1 or PI2 is the only explanatory variable besides the lagged
value of the independent variable, turnover. Even in the full models with all the control variables,
PI2 is significant in the decile sort (Model 12) and PI1 in the quintile sort (Model 11). In
particular, PI2 is significant in all six models of the decile sort that use PI2 as a measure of
private information. Evidence in favor of hypothesis 2 is more mixed. MV(t)* |RmRf| proxies for
publicly available market information. Without the addition of control variables, the proxy is
significant in the decile sort when PI2 is used as a measure of private information (Model 4). In
the quintile sort, the public information proxy is significant regardless of whether PI1 or PI2 is
used as a measure of private information. In the full model with all the control variables, the
public information proxy is significant only in the quintile sort with PI1 as a measure of private
information (Model 11). However, the sub-period analysis with truncated data finds strong
evidence in support of hypothesis 2 in the second sub-period 1998-2006 when ten percent of the
stocks having the lowest liquidity or lowest price are deleted from the data. This implies that
managers of high institutional ownership stocks in the most recent period do rely more on public
information for their stocks but not so if the stocks have a low price or the firms have poor
liquidity. Finally, the first order autoregressive model provides further support for hypothesis 1.
The results show that turnover volume of stocks with lower institutional holdings is affected by
trader’s private information (PI1).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of share price, daily volume, firm size, and private information
measures
High-Institutional
Low-Institutional
High High Ownership (top decile)
Ownership (bottom
Low
Low
decile)
Mean Median Std
Mean Median Std
Mean
Median
Dev.
Dev.
(t(p-vale)
value)
PRC
32.30 28.25
26.71 5.32
2.25
14.57 746.8
<0.0001
Log(size)
20.71 20.75
1.31
17.49 17.16
1.90
1147.3 <0.0001
Turnover
0.0068 0.0042 0.0112 0.0028 0.0007 0.0145 186.2
<0.0001
Detrended
0.091 0.075
1.089 -0.016 0.063
2.530 78.1
<0.0001
Turnover
Hpret
0.224 0.139
0.544 0.085 -0.087 1.23
88.5
<0.0001
PI1
0.534 0.593
1.930 2.29
2.24
1.62
577.6
<0.0001
PI2
0.576 0.626
0.296 0.80
0.89
0.25
493.1
<0.0001
No. of
734699
702120
observations
PRC is share price; Hpret is holding period return and PI1 and PI2 are measures of private
information as defined in the text.
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Table 2
Results of the SUR models when run for the full sample period on the highest and low e s t ~ portfolios sorted on the basis
of institutional ownership

Private information me.asure is Pll in odd numbered models and PI2 in even numbered models

intercept

Yt

Mo,M 1
High
Low

Morl,J ?.
High
Low

MonF.1,
High
Low

MonF.1 4
High
Low

0.0341
11.21
0.6349
31.52

0.01 46
2.39
0.818
40.38

0.033 7
11.31
0.60 71
36.91

0.0293
9.3 7
0. 7408
24.41

0.028 7 0.0234 0.00 75
9.38
3.97
-0.95
0.7279 0. 7823 0.7279
26.73 57.58 23.79

0.0261
1.96
0.8411
41.31

0.0483
-j.31

0.0193
-2.28

0.02 71 0.00 75
-2.28
0.66

0.0286 0.0256
-1.92
-2.03

0.0219
-1.67

0.0068 0.0139
0.61
-0.93

0.0274
-2.34

0.0199
-1.52

0.0038
0.52

0.2674 0.3129
-8.52
-8.34
8.5719 5.3324
6.32
1.91

0.2615
-8.55
9.0401
6.9:;

0.0323 0.2667
-8. 71
-8.61
6.1926 7.1228
2.25
5.16

-31.28
-8.34
5.3509
1.89

0.2611
-8.59
7.3799
5.5

0.2998
-8.16
6.9011
2.19

4.3081
5.81

0.1531
-0.13

3.8377
5.05

0.2527
0.21

0.0158
2.63
0. 7368
56.07

0.0243
3.94
0.84 73
41.22

MonF.1 ~
High
Low

MonF.1 6
High
Low
0.0062
-0.81
0. 7763
26.64

0.0218
1.67
0.7828
57.59

Vt.Info

IvIV1

~

Volatility

lv!kts:Y.2!;i,ti!i!v
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Stk..Runu.2
M.1',igm.~!!!JJill
F-value
Hypothesis 1

2.98
(0.0845)

3.94
(0.04 70)

0.03
(0.3588)

2.80
(0 .0941)

0.60
(0.4385)

2.67
(0.100))
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M.I*-

Hypothesis 2

1.36
(0.2428)

1.12
(0.2904)

0.40
(0.5268)

0.22
(0.638:;)

Table 2 (Continued)
Results of the SUR models when run for the full sample period on the highest and lowest.~ portfolios sorted on the
basis of institutional ownership

intercept

~
Vt.Infu

M.Infa

Model 8
High
Low

0.0107
-1.35
0.6267
23.6

0.0094
-1.22
0.723 7
26.56

0.00 71
0.44
0.8465
40.94

0.0042
0.2 7
0.7811
57.42

Model 9
High
LO\V

Model 10
Lo,v
High

Model 11
Lo,v
High

Model 12
High
Low

0.0186
-2.14
0.6771
21.14

0.0151
-1.81
0.6929
24.91

0.0168
-1.94
0.6749
21.09

0.01 45
-1. 74
0.6928
24.9

0.0189
-0.64
0.7943
36.04

0.0053
-0.33
0. 7506
53.35

0.0081
-0.49
0. 7827
35.37

0.0135 0.0254 0.0198 0.0077 0.0041
-0.91
-1.98
-1.51
0.78
0.26

0.0084 0.0177 0.0114 0.0047 0.0084
-0.96
-1.36
1.03
0.31
-0.96
0.2649 0.331 7 0.2594 0.2982 0.2451 0.2851 0.2361 0.2701 0.2438 0.2824
-1.53
-7.33
-7.71
-7.79
-7.49
-8.55
-8.31
-8.53
-8.51
-7.83
7.1241 5.9724 7.3422 4. 7011 7.4963 3.9386 7.4432 4.603 7 7.3458 4.191 7
5.3-1
5.12
1.37
1.65
5.39
1.3·1
5.52
1.62
5.27
1.·15

0.0052
-0.33
0. 7506
53.53

0.0176 0.0115
-1.35
1.03
0.2374
-7.72
7.2898
5.0~

0.2303
-7.33
4.5595
1.06
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~olatility

6.3733 2.5446 5.8236 2.0748 7.3659 3.9763 6.6811 3.1629 7.3159 3.7403 6.5519 3.1688
-2.5
3.15
-2.02
3.39
-2.36
3.09
-2.03
2.96
-1.6
2.75
-1.32
3.43

~

2.2394 5.3165 1.8063 5.50 7 4 2.7342 8.5666
-1.01
2.27
-0.84
2.24
-1.22
3.54
0.1098 0.3814
1. 71
2.7

latilitv

Stk Runu2
MJMmentum

2.4044
-1.09
0.1208
1.89

7.5618 2. 7581
3.28
-1.23
-3108 0.0144
2.84
1.62

8.5534
3.85
0.3309
2.98

2.2693
-1.02
0.1153
1.81

7.5754
3.29
0.3103
2.83
a
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Model 7
High
Low

t-value
Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 2

0.6422 0.2051
-1.64
-0.25

0.6429 0.1839
-1.64
-0.22

0.47
(0 .4934)

2.67
(0.1000)

0.52
(0.4495)

2.90
(0.088 7)

0.56
(0.4565)

2.8 ,
(0.0902)

1.21
(0 .2708)

0.88
(0.3483)

1.31
(0.2519)

1.04
(0.3086)

1.23
(0 .2674)

0.96
(0.3269)
0
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The table shows SUR estimates of the models:
Model 1: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + bhi*Vhi,t + chi*Vhi,t*PI1hi,t
: Vlo,t+1 = alo + b(lo)*Vlo,t + clo*Vlo,t*PI1lo,t
Model 2: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + bhi*Vhi,t + chi*Vhi,t*PI2hi,t
: Vlo,t+1 = alo + b(lo)*Vlo,t + clo*Vlo,t*PI2lo,t
Model 3: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) +
e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf|
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf|
Model 4: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf|
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf|
Model 5: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) +
e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t
Model 6: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t
Model 7: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt
Model 8: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt
Model 9: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) +
e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t
Model 10: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t
Model 11: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t + M_momentumt
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
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flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t + M_momentumt
Model 12: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t + M_momentumt
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t + M_momentumt
The subscripts hi and lo denote the portfolio with the highest and lowest institutional ownership
respectively and t is a subscript that tracks the periods. V is detrended log turnover, PI1 and PI2
are two measures of private information, V*PI1 (PI2) is V.Info; MV is detrended log turnover of
the market, and |RmRf| is the absolute value of the difference between the return on the market
and the risk free rate. MV(t)* |RmRf| is M.Info and proxies for publicly available market
information; Stk.Volatility is stock volatility and M_Volat is market volatility; stk_runnup is
stock runup and M_momentum is market momentum.
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Table 3
Results of the SUR models when run for the full sample period on the highest and lowest quintile portfolios sorted on the
basis of institutional ownership

Private.information measure is PI 1 in odd numbere:1 models and PI2 in even numbere.d models

intercept

Y1

Model I
Low
High

Model 2
Low
High

Model 3
Low
High

Model 4
Low
High

Model 5
Low
High

0.02:;4
8.31
0.6919
35.lS

0.0077
1.94
0.8206
38.41

0.0222
8.09
0.9311
15.04

0.0087
2.21
0.7899
13.49

0.0232
8.08
0.7898
21.01

0.0232
7.82
0.94 79
12.98

0.0065
-0.95
0.7562
19.96

0.001 5
0.18

0.4425

-5.13

0.0136
0.21

0.0533 0.0094
-3.56
-1.16

0.0183
4.51
0.8585
46.67

0.01 83
4.54
0.8966
15.44

Model 6
Luvv
High

0.0283 0.0093
3.46
-1.3 7
0.8093 0.8534
l 1.48
40.72

0.0298
3.54
0.9002
14.55

VLlnfu

~

Stk.Volatilitx

l.'vlkt. V olatilitv
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Stk _Runu,2
M.Momentum

0.2891
-7.81
8.4841
6.55

o.:;037
-12.12
4.5111
2.49

0.2929 0.0753 0.0396
-3 .35
-1.44
-2.43
0.2799
-7.81
8.2496
6.29

0.001 7 0.1867 0.0834
-1.45
-2.1 1
-1.29

0.2988 0.2696 0.300 7 0.2669 0.2951
-12.14 -7.48
-1 2.09 -7.46
-12.01
4.5272 7.2377 4.9213 7.0517 4.9956
<"
_,.:,:,
2.51
5.52
2.69
2.71
3.4546
0.81

1.0131 :;_6761
-1.4 1
5.31

1.2792
- 1.49
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M.Info

0.0766
-5.31

F-value
Hypothesis 1

23.75
(0 .0001)

20.31
(.0001)

Hypothesis 2

7.02
(0.0)81)

4.36
(0.0368)

2.24
(0.1345)

0.94
(0 .3314)

5.65
(0 .01 75)

4.87
(0.0274)

1.92
(0.1664)

1.44
(0.2301)

Table 3 (Continue.cl)
Results of the SUR models when run for the full sample period on the highest and lowest quintile portfolios sorted on the
basis of institutional ownership

int.er:ept

Model 7
High
Low

Model 8
High
Low

0.0108
-1.53
0.7473
19.59

0.010 7
-1.94
0.8449
11.34

Model9
High
Low

Mode! IO
High
Low

0.0362 0.0113 0.1848
-2.38
-1.29
-2.07

MY$.

0.2622
-7.25
7.1 239
5.37

0.2957
-12.03
4.1355
2.22

Yt

-

M.Info
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Stk.Volatilit)'.

0.3013
-1 2.1 2
4.1145
2.19

0.2602
-7.24
6.8307
5.15

0.0169
1.63
0.9039
15.56

0.0191
-2.44
0. 7109
18.34

0.2476
-6.81
7.4629
5.62

0.00 79
0.74
0.8029
35.72

0.2775
-11.08
4.4165
2.37

0.2459
-6.81
7.2405
5.41

0.009 7
0.93
0.8353
14.02

0.2719
-10.99
4.2867
2.29

Model 12
High
Low

0.01 85
-2.38
0.8098
l E.03

0.0209
-0.271
0. 7661
10.13

0.00 78
0.74
0.8031
35.72

0.0097
0.92
0.8364
14.26

0.0368 0.1)234 0.001 8 0.1081 0.0368
-0.57
-1.53
0.22
-1.21
-0.57
0.2496
6. 79
7.3563
5.54

0.2772
-1 1.08
4.4277
2.37

0.2552
-0.79
7.1388
5.32

0.2781
-10.~8
4.3206
2.31

5.9721 3.9209 5.4626 3.2003 6.1708 3.6623 6.2633 3.7558 6.58 16 3.68 17 6.1031 3.7786
-l..Y/
1..:;:;
-l..6/
-i.04
-i .l:l
-i .9'.>
-i .l )
l..91
Lli
'.l.84
'.l.66

'.l.)9

lvlkt .Volatilit)'. 2 .1 777 3.4377 1.3525 3.5888 2.3055
-0.92
2.19
-0.57
2.28
-0.89
0.1494
Stk _Runu,2
2.38

4.8508
3.66
0.2583
3.07

1.6375
-0.69
0.1371
2.19

4.2877
3.03
0.2842
2.93

2.1905
-0.92
0.1 443
2.29

4.8655
3.07
0.2538
3.06

1.4741
-0.62
0.1316
2.11

4.7983
3.04
0.2403
2.93

a
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Villfu

0.0214
-2.77
0.7674
10.14
0.0868 0.0235 0.0019 0.1084
-1.34
-1.65
0.22
-1.21

0.0163
1.63
0.8549
40. 72

Model!!
High
Low

MMomentum
F-value
Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 2

0.4094 0.0559 0.4181
-1.09
0.11
1.11

0.1 432
0.26

2.19
(0.1393)

0.85
(0.3562)

2.69
(0.0984)

0.45
(0.5002)

2. 74
(0.0988)

0.45
(0.5031)

3.07
(0.0801)

2.4 7
(0.1160)

3.20
(0.0735)

2.96
(0.0854)

2.96
(0.0855)

2.66
(0.l0i0)
a
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The table shows SUR estimates of the models:
Model 1: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + bhi*Vhi,t + chi*Vhi,t*PI1hi,t
: Vlo,t+1 = alo + b(lo)*Vlo,t + clo*Vlo,t*PI1lo,t
Model 2: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + bhi*Vhi,t + chi*Vhi,t*PI2hi,t
: Vlo,t+1 = alo + b(lo)*Vlo,t + clo*Vlo,t*PI2lo,t
Model 3: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) +
e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf|
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf|
Model 4: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf|
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf|
e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
Model 5: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t
Model 6: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t
Model 7: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt
Model 8: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt
Model 9: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) +
e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t
Model 10: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t
Model 11: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t + M_momentumt
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: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t + M_momentumt
Model 12: Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t + M_momentumt
: V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t + M_momentumt
The subscripts hi and lo denote the portfolio with the highest and lowest institutional ownership
respectively and t is a subscript that tracks the periods. V is detrended log turnover, PI1 and PI2
are two measures of private information, V*PI1 (PI2) is V.Info; MV is detrended log turnover of
the market, and |RmRf| is the absolute value of the difference between the return on the market
and the risk free rate. MV(t)* |RmRf| is M.Info and proxies for publicly available market
information; Stk.Volatility is stock volatility and M_Volat is market volatility; stk_runnup is
stock runup and M_momentum is market momentum.
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Table 4
Summary of sub-period and truncated data analysis
Sort
Whole Period
1990-1997
Decile Daily
H1: significant in
H1: significant in
models
models 2,4,6,10,12
1,2,4,6,8,10,12
H2: all insignificant
H2: all insignificant
Quintile Daily

Decile Daily No PRC

H2: all
insignificant

H1: significant in
models 1,2,3,4,9,11

H1: significant in
models 1,2

H1: significant in
models 1,2,3

H2: correct sign in
all. Significant in
models 3,4,7,9,10,11

H2: correct sign in
all. Significant in
models
3,4,9,10,11,12
H1: significant in
model 2

H2: all
insignificant

H1: significant in
models
1,2,3,4,6,8,10,12
H2: all insignificant
~

Quintile Daily No
PRC

1998-2006
H1: significant in 2

H1: significant in
models
1,2,3,9,10,11,12

H1: significant in
all models

B5

H2: wrong sign and H2: correct sign in
significant in all
all. Significant in
models
models
3,4,5,6,7,9,11
H1: significant in
H1: significant in
~
models
models
,<I
1,2,5,9,10,11,12
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,11
~

Decile Daily No Size

Quintile Daily No Size

H2: correct sign in
all. All significant.

H2: correct sign in H2: correct sign in
all. Significant in
all. Significant in
models
all models
4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12

H1: significant in
models 1,2,10,12

H1: significant in
models 2,11,12

H1: all
insignificant

H2: all insignificant

H2: wrong sign and
significant in all
models
H1: significant in
models
1,2,3,8,10

H2: correct sign in
all. Significant in
models 3,4
H1: all
insignificant

H1: significant in
model 1

H2: all insignificant

Decile Daily No Liq

H1: all insignificant

H2: correct sign in H2: all
all. Significant in
insignificant
all models.
H1: all insignificant H1: all
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insignificant

Quintile Daily No Liq

H2: all insignificant
except model 3

H2: all insignificant

H1: significant in
models 1,3

H1: significant in
models 1,3,5

H2: correct sign in
all. Significant in
all models.
H1: significant in
model 1

H2: correct sign in
all. Significant in
models 3, 4

H2: correct sign in
all. Significant in
models 10, 12

H2: correct sign in
all. Significant in
models 1,3, 7

Table 4 (Continued):
Significant means significant at the one, five or ten percent level.
No PRC means 10% of the firms with the lowest share price have been deleted from the full data
set.
No Size means 10% of the firms with the smallest size have been deleted from the full data set.
No Liq means 10% of the firms with the lowest liquidity have been deleted from the full data set.
H1 is hypothesis 1 and H2 is hypothesis 2.
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Table 5
Serial correlation and the effect of information flow on stock trading of high versus low
institutional ownership (t-values in brackets).
Table 5 Panel A
Intercept
a1
Model Fitness
___________________________________________________
High
0.0901
0.0099
F=192.79
(8.14)
(4.52)
(p<0.0001)
Low

-0.165
0.042
F=1127.5
(-2.39)
(6.48)
(p<0.0001)
___________________________________________________
High-Low
-0.032
(-4.63)
The table shows estimates of the time-series cross-sectional regression on all the individual
stocks:
Model : Vi,t+1 = Σ a0,ik Dk,t+1 + a1,iVi,t + εi,t+1
V is detrended log(turnover) and D is day of the week dummy variable.
Table 5 Panel B:
Intercept
a1
a2
Model Fitness
_________________________________________________________________
High
0.0896
0.0097
0.0007
F=106.29
(7.30)
(6.01)
(0.90)
(p<0.0001)
Low

-0.1635
0.0364
0.0017
F =523.1
(-0.06)
(5.01)
(1.89)***
(p<0.0001)
_________________________________________________________________
High-Low
-0.032
-0.0010
(-3.29))
(-0.67)
The table shows estimates of the time-series cross-sectional regression on all the individual
stocks:
Model : Vi,t+1 = Σ a0,ik Dk,t+1 + a1,iVi,t + a2,iVi,tPI1i,t + εi,t+1
V is detrended log(turnover), D is day of the week dummy variable and PI1 is a measure of
private information.
Table 5 Panel C:
Intercept
a1
a2
Model Fitness
_________________________________________________________________
High
0.0901
0.0079
0.0011
F=98.90
(7.41)
(3.14)
(1.33)
(p<0.0001)
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Low

-0.1601
0.0420
0.0007
F =563.9
(-2.22)
(3.48)
(1.10)
(p<0.0001)
_________________________________________________________________
High-Low
-0.034
0.0004
(-2.17))
(0.14)
The table shows estimates of the time-series cross-sectional regression on all the individual
stocks:
Model : Vi,t+1 = Σ a0,ik Dk,t+1 + a1,iVi,t + a2,iVi,tPI2i,t + εi,t+1
V is detrended log(turnover), D is day of the week dummy variable and PI2 is a measure of
private information.
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